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Abst raci 
The two experiments presented here are an extension of 
work done on implicit learning by Arthur S. Reber. 
Subjects memorized strings of ]etters during the 
acquisition phase. Some of the letter strings were created 
using a finite state grammar (grammatical items), whi J e 
others were random]y created (nongrammatical items). A 
total of four different types of acquisition exposure were 
used in the two experiments: no exposure, a]J grammatical 
exposure, aJJ nongrammatical exposure, and mixed exposure 
(both grammat i ca] and nongrammatical items). After 
memorizing 1he acquisition list, subjects were informed 
that the items they memorized were either rule created, 
randomly created, or both, depending upon their exposure 
category. A3 J subjects participated in a discrimination 
task, in which they were required to identify previously 
unseen grammatica] and nongrammal ical items as being either 
rule created (grammatical) or randomly created 
( nongrammat i cal ) . Analysis of the subjects' discriminatory 
ability found that subjects who saw all grammatical items 
during acquisition were significantly better at identifying 
rule and randomly created items than all other subjects. 
Since none of the all grammatical exposure subjects were 
able to verbalize the finite state grammar rules or give an 
accurate account  of their decision processes,  it  was 
presumed that their learning about Hie grammar was implicit 
(nonconscjous). Subjects in the other exposure groups 
(nongrammatical, no exposure, mixed exposure) did no1 reach 
the performance ]eve]s of the grammatical exposure group, 
but did perform at above chance ] eveJ s. These subjeds 
were able to make systematic guesses on the discrimination 
task that enabled them to score at significanl levels, 
possibly by using their prior knowledge of probability 
rules and randomness. Subjects in the mixed exposure 
groups, while exposed to some grammatical items during 
acquisition, did not seem to be able to utilize the 
grammatical information in any consistent way when making 
discriminations. This could be due either to a dearth of 
grammatical instances for study, or to confusion caused by 
the inclusion of nongrammat i cal instances which might have 
been treated as valid grammatical instances. Because 
subjects can utilize prior knowledge when discriminating 
items, control groups are essential for setting the true 
guessing  baselines  in  implicit   learning   experiments. 
Int roduct j on 
Human beings are  capable of  learning   extremely  complex 
and     complicated     material.        Paradoxically,     they     are  noi 
always   capable  of explaining  or  identifying     this     learning 
process.        In     some     cases,     the     individual     is  completely 
unaware that    learning  has  taken  place.      In  order  to  capture 
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ihe     learning     process,      an     experimenter must    ask  no1   only 
what   is  being  Jearned,   but   a]so how  j1    is  being   learned. 
The  purpose  of the   curreni   experiraenls  was   lo     further 
elaborate     on work on  implicil    (nonconscious)   learning  done 
by Arthur  S.   Reber   (A]]en  &  Reber,   1980;     Kassin     &     Reber, 
1979;      Reber,   1967,   1969,    1976;   Reber   &   A]Jen,   1978;   Reber, 
Kassin,      Lewjs     &     Cantor,      1980;     Reber     &     Lewis,      1977). 
Reber's     experiments  consisted  of  several   phases,   the   first 
of     which     was     an     acquisition     phase       wherein       subjects 
memorized   items  generated by  a  grammar.      Subjects   then took 
a  discrimination  test      and     tried     to     identify     previously 
unseen     items     as     grammatica]      or     nongrammatical.        These 
experiments  did  not   contain contro]      groups,     leaving     open 
the     possibility that   subjects   could be  learning  during  the 
testing     phase     of     the     experiment      rather       than       during 
acquisition.        In     addition,     the     lack     of    proper  control 
groups  obscures  the  extent   lo which  subjeel   behavior  on  the 
test        is       due       to     previously     learned     information     and 
heuri sides     rather     than,   to     information     acquired     during 
acquisition. Control      subjects     who     do    not      experience 
grammalical exposure during acquisiton are necessary in 
order to isolate the extent events outside of the 
acquisition phase contribute to behavior which could be 
misconstrued as evidence of implicit learning. This is 
done  in  Experimenl    1   of  this  paper. 
Another  area  of concern  in  Reber's   experiments   is     the 
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fad thai the acquisition set contains on] y grammatically 
correct items. It js very rare in real-life to 3 earn 
anything without the inclusion of some malformed or 
erroneous instances; chi3dren learning the concept of 
"furniture", for example, have to deal with the mail on the 
table and the tricycle on the floor which are not pieces of 
furniture, but have some "furniture" characteristics (you 
can sit on a tricycle). Thus Reber's stimulus environment 
may be so special that it allows for a type of learning 
behavior not found under more typical circumstances; seeing 
only items belonging to a category may allow subjects to 
easily discriminate that category. Having to isolate the 
category definition when both category instances and 
noninstances are present may prove more difficult. On the 
other hand, noninstances could provide additional 
information about the limits of the category, and thus 
could improve discriminatory performance. The effect of 
category noninstances on implicit learning is explored in 
the   second   experiment . 
Reber's   Implicit   Abstraction   Paradigm 
In order to provide background for the two studies 
presented in this paper, a history of Reber's work to date 
on implicit learning will first be presented. Studies 
which refute and/or support his findings will be reviewed. 
An  overview of  Reber's  implicit   abstraction model      is     also 
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presented. Impldcdt 1earndng does noi f d t neatly d nt o the 
framework of more traddtdonal Jearndng theordes; Reber 
assumes that he ds dealdng with analytical, nonconscdous 
1earnd ng. 
A]] of Reber's experiments concern the learning of 
artificial languages. These languages are generated by 
usdng   fdndte   state  grammars   (FSGs).     An  example  of  one   such 
3 n SO'} *out 
Figure   1.     Fdndte  slate  grammar  used  to generate 
stdmuld.     Each  transdtdon  from  one  state  to 
another  state  corresponds  1o  a  rule   (Reber,   1967) 
grammar ds dn Fdgure 1. Grammatical strdngs are generated 
by any serd es of state transdtdons from the dndtdal state 
(SO) to the exdt state (SO'). A strdng ds generated dn a 
fdxed order, from past state to future state, and 1 he 
resultant serd es of letters ds writien from left to right 
wdth the rightmost letter being the one most recently 
generated (Chomsky & Mdller, 1958). For example, the state 
sequence 0-1-1-2-3-4-0' for the grammar dn Fdgure 1 would 
generate  the  strdng  TSXXVV.     Note that   while     this     grammar 
embodies a f j ni 1 e set of ruJes (slate t ransi 1 i ons) , it can 
generate an infinite number of strings of length 3 to 
infinity. When working with PSGs, most experimenters 
arbitrarily sei a Jength limit for stimulus items, and then 
use the FSG to generate all possible items of the required 
1 ength. 
Reber chose to use FSGs in his experiments because 
they generate complex stimulus items of a probabilistic 
nature (Reber, 1967). For example, for the set of all 
possible strings from Ihe grammar shown in Figure 1, the 
probability is 0.5 thai an item will begin with P, and 
there is a 0.25 probability that the second letter will be 
a T. These probabilistic state interrelationships bias 
agai ns1 an existing encoding strategy that would allow 
subjecis to use conscious mnemonics successfully (Reber, 
1976). In       real-life,        many       complex        stimuli        have 
contingencies  which  are     nol      immediately     discernible     but 
which     are    highly probabilistic   in  nature,   such  as  weather 
patterns       and       spelling        (Reber & Allen, 1978). 
Unforlunalely, the rules governing the creation of 
nalurally occurring complex stimuli are often hard -to 
specify. Fi ni 1 e stale grammars are useful in experimental 
settings because they general e complex stimuli with 
probabilistic inira-relationships, and have the added 
benefit thai the experimenl er can completely specify all of 
the  generative  rules   for  the  grammar. 
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In his earliest experiment, Reber (1967) had subjects 
memorize either grammal i caJ strings or random] y formed 
strings. Subjects were no1 t o] d about the possible 
existence of a rule system (grammar) until after they had 
successfully memorized the strings, which were presenl ed in 
7 sets of 4 strings per set . The four strings in a set 
were presented one at a lime in sequence, af1 er which the 
subject tried to reproduce them. This process was repeated 
for each set of four strings until the subject could 
correctly reproduce the strings on two consecutive 
occasi ons. 
Analysis of 1 he learning patterns for subjecis 
learning grammatical strings versus those learning randomly 
formed (nongrammatical) si rings showed thai both groups had 
a decrease in errors from the first to second set . In 
addition, the grammatical string subjecis continued to show 
a decline in number of errors across the remaining sets. 
Reber hypothesized that after the first se1 , subjects 
selected a systematic memorization strategy (one i 1 em a1 a 
time) rather than trying to retain all 4 items a1 once. 
This accounts for the initial decrease in errors for both 
groups. Since grammatical exposure subject performance 
continued to improve beyond that of the nongrammatical 
exposure subjects, the grammatical exposure subjects must 
have been using information or organizalion techniques 
unavailable to  the  nongrammatical    (randomly     formed     items) 
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exposure     subjects.        However,   inquiries   of the  grammatjca] 
exposure   subjeels   did  noi   elicit   any     verbal     knowledge     of 
the  FSG  rules,   even with     prompl ing. 
Reber (1967) designed a second experiment to determine 
if the grammatical exposure subjects did indeed "know" the 
FSG rules. Subjects learned grammalical items as before, 
and then were told about the existence of a set of rules; 
they were not told the exact nature of the ruJes. The 
subjects were then given a list of 44 new strings, half of 
which    were    previously     unseen     grammatica]      items. The 
remaining   strings  were  nongrammatical   items,   some with  very 
subtle     errors     (one     letter     FSG     violations). Subjects 
classified these strings into grammatical        and 
nongrammatical categories at a rate well above chance (an 
average of 69% correct). String length did not account for 
this behavior, since all grammatical items were called 
nongrammat i cal at about the same rale. Subjects were again 
unable to verbalize any rules used in making their 
decisions. Because the subjects' discriminatory behavior 
indicated ihey did indeed have knowledge about what 
constituted grammatical items, their continued inability to 
verbalize this knowledge led Reber to postulate a 
nonconscious (implicit) learning process. During the 
memorization phase of the experiment, subjects seemed to be 
implicitly (nonconsciously) absorbing details of the FSG 
rule   structure,   which  enabled  them  to  decrease  the  rate     of 
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memorization errors and 1 o make grammatical versus 
nongrammat j ca] distinctions in the test phase. Reber 
hypothesized that subjects were not consciously analyzing 
the memorization strings, and were not even aware of the 
existence of the rules they were "using" to make decisions 
about   the  test    strings. 
Reber and Lewis (1977) repeated the above experiment 
with similar results. After having memorized PSG generated 
items, subjects were capable of discriminating new 
grammatical items from nongrammat i cal items {single letter 
FSG violations) at a mean rate of 80% correct, regardless 
of item length. Subjects also solved anagram puzzles by 
rearranging a scrambled set of letters into an FSG 
acceptable order. Performance on this task improved 
significantly over trials despite the absence of feedback 
on correctness. In post-experimental essays, subjects 
confidently defined rules which were totally inconsistent 
with their performance on both the discrimination and 
anagram tasks. The fact that subjects were not consciously 
aware of the true regularity of the system nor of their own 
correspondingly regular behavior provided further evidence 
for 1 he existence of nonconscious learning. Reber (1967, 
1969) defined implicit learning as an analytical process 
that operates at a nonconscious level to extract 
regularities from the environmental stimuli. The result of 
implicit    learning  i s   an  abstract   internal   representation of 
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the  underlying  rule   system which  can     be     used     in     deaJjng 
wi t h  new  stimuli. 
Results remarkably consistent with Reber's findings 
were found using FSG pat 1erns of nonspeech sounds (Howard & 
Ball as, 1980). Subjects who tried to learn FSG general ed 
sound patterns improved their retention rate with practice, 
but subjects who tried to learn randomly generated patterns 
did not. In addition, the FSG pattern subjects were 
significantly better at discriminating FSG items from noise 
(randomly created) items. Thus implicit learning of the 
underlying generative rules can occur with both visual and 
aural stimuli, and does not require a language environment 
(letters); implicit abstraction still occurs with stimuli 
composed  of nonspeech  sounds   and  tones. 
Implicit   Learning   in  Other   Paradigms 
While not directly related to Reber's work, the 
following studies also seem to demonstrate the existence of 
a nonconscious implicit abstraction process. Jones (1973) 
performed a serial learning task in which subjects were 
asked to learn numerical items consisting of 24 digits. 
Each item was presented for study 8 times in succession. 
After each of the 8 study trials, the subject tried to 
write down as many of the digits as possible. Unbeknownst 
to the subjects, some of the items were sequentially 
organized   (e.g.   112233665544223344554433)   so  that   the  order 
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of subsequent digits depended upon the order of the 
preceding digits. Other items were randomly organized, 
with no consistent relationships between the digits. 
Subjects were able to exploit the pattern symmetries when 
learning items with a sequential organization, resulting in 
a reduced error rate over trials relative to performance on 
the       non-ordered        (randomly       organized)        items. The 
sequentially organized stimuli met Reber's requirements for 
nonconscious learning by being both complex and 
probabilistic in nature. While Jones did not question the 
subjects to determine the degree of conscious versus 
nonconscious analysis, she felt that the subjects, who had 
no previous knowledge that a rule system for organization 
existed, were forming an implicit abstraction of the rules 
which  could be  used  to  aide   subsequent   learning. 
A later serial learning study by Marmurek and Johnson 
(1978) required subjects to learn permutations of a base 
sequence of letters. Learning took place during an 
anticipation paired associate task. On each trial, 
subjects first saw a base sequence of letters followed by a 
symbol . They were instructed to call out the permutation 
sequence they expected to see, and were then shown the 
correct permutation for a brief study period. Some of 
these permutations were consistently organized, so that a 
given letter was always regrouped in conjunction with other 
letters   and  was  not      separated     from     them     by     intervening 
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letters. Other permulations were random]y organized, with 
no restrictions on Jeiier regroupings. Despite controlling 
for the frequency of adjacent sets of 1 el t ers in both 
permutation types, the consistently organized permutations 
resu]ted in significanl ly fewer anticipation errors 
overa]J. WhiJe subjeels were not questioned about their 
strategies, it was again assumed that the probabi J i st i c 
i nt errel at ionships of the consistent stimuli enabled 
subjects to implicitly pick up on the permutation 
consistencies and improve their guessing accordingly. In 
both of the previous serial learning experiments, subjects 
were not informed about the existence of rules, but were 
still capable       of       implicitly       using       the        existing 
organizational information as an aid in learning and 
discriminating   items. 
While it has thus been demonstrated that learning can 
take place when subjects are not aware that rules or 
stimulus palterns exist, it is still not clear from the 
above sludies whether conscious search strategies are also 
involved in what has been called "implicit learning." Baron 
and Hodge (1978) attempl ed to suppress conscious searching 
for rules by informing their subjects that no rules or 
interrelationships among stimulus items existed. It was 
assumed that subjects would not bother investing time in a 
conscious analysis of the stimuli which could not be 
expected  to   impart      any    worthwhile     information.        In     the 
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Baron and Hodge experiment , subjecls ]earned 1o pronounce 
nonsense words wr i t t en in an art ificial aJ phabet . While 
subjects were iold that no correspondences existed between 
letters and sounds, half of the stimulus items did possess 
correspondences, with       certain       J et t ers       consistently 
associated with  specific   sounds.     The  correspondences     were 
from     ri ght-t o-l eft ,      so     that      the     rightmost      J et t er    was 
associated with  the  initial      sound     of     the     word     and     the 
leftmost      Jetter    with the  terminal   sound.     The  other words 
were  randomly created   so  that   letters  and     sounds     did     not 
correspond     to     each other  in  any  consistent   way.     Subjects 
were  given  25   runs   through  the  list   of letter-sound     pairs, 
with     the     subject      attempting     to     anticipate     the  correct 
pronunciation  for  each word.     Subjects     made     significantly 
more     pronunciation     errors     when  learning  1 he  random  items 
than when  learning  the  correspondence  items.     When given     a 
transfer     task     involving     pronouncing     a previously  unseen 
correspondence  item,   subjects performed   significantly  above 
chance. 
In order to test the robustness of this result, the 
correspondence rule (right-to-left) was identified for the 
subjects and they repeated the transfer task. There was no 
significant increase in performance. Explicit knowledge of 
the correspondence rule thus did not add to the subjects 
ability to decode and pronounce items; they had already 
implicitly  learned  a comparable  amount   of    knowledge     about 
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the correspondences between the letters and sounds. 
Subjects were able to extract the Jetter-sound regularities 
which app]jed to ha]f of the words without the aid of 
explicit instruction and despite verba] evidence that no 
such regularities existed. It appears that implicit 
learning may operate effectively despite conscious 
expectations  that   there  are  no  rules  to be  learned. 
While the kinds of rules used in the preceding 
experiments were very different (from FSGs to right->left 
correspondences), all of them impose a degree of regularity 
on otherwise meaningless stimuli. Some kind of constant 
covarialion between stimulus items seems critical in order 
for implicit learning to take place (Nagata, 1981). It 
could be argued that all that is required in implicit 
abstraction is recognition       of       regularity       versus 
irregularity (randomness). Kantowitz (1971, in Britton, 
1980) tested this possibility by training subjects on FSG 
generated strings, followed by a discrimination task using 
new strings from the original FSG (grammatical items) and 
strings from a second FSG (nongrammatical items). Subjects 
were able to identify grammatical items at a rate well 
above chance. Since the nongrammatical items were also 
ordered stimuli, subjects should not have been able to 
distinguish grammatical items from nongrammat i cal items 
simply by recognizing "regularity". Of course, since this 
study did  not   possess  a  control   group,   it   must     be     assumed 
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t hat t he t wo PSGs were so similar that uninformed subjects 
(with no acquisition experience) could not easily 
distinguish them. If the two FSGs were indeed sufficiently 
alike, then correct discrimination must haved involved more 
detailed knowledge of the  underlying  grammatical   rules. 
Implicit   versus  Explicit   Learning 
As Reber (1967) and Reber and Lewis (1977) have shown, 
detailed knowledge of the underlying rules does not appear 
to       be       verbalizable       by       the subjects. However, 
nonverbalizable and implicit (nonconscious) learning are 
not necessarily synonymous. In an attempt to clarify the 
differences between explicit and implicit learning, Reber 
(1976) repeated his learning-discrimination study (Reber, 
1967) using both informed and uninformed subjects. The 
uninformed subjects (implicit group) were instructed simply 
to memorize the FSG generated acquisition strings, while 
the informed subjects (explicit group) were 1 old that 
discovering the rules would make memorization easier. 
Results showed that explicitly searching for rul es act ual 1 y 
made learning more difficult; the explicit group took 
significantly longer to memorize the items. The explicit 
group was also significantly poorer than the implicit group 
at discriminating grammatical items from nongrammatical 
ones, though both groups performed at an above chance 
1 evel . 
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In order to t est the consistency of I he responses, the 
items jn the discrimination test were repeated. Responses 
to the same item can be construed to be based upon some 
decision strategy or knowledge if the number of 
grammat i ca]-grammat i ca] and nongrammat i ca]-nongrammat i caJ 
responses is significant1y above chance expectations. The 
implicit group had a significantJy high incidence of 
correct-correct responses, indicating the stability of 
their "know]edge". The explicit group's knowledge was 
stable, but inaccurate, as evidenced by a high double error 
rate. The implicit group's double correct rate was 
approximately equal to the explicit group's double error 
rate, indicating that while both groups apparently learned 
the same amount, what the explicit group learned was 
incorrect. It appears that the explicit rule-search 
process masked the implicit process, leading subjects to 
consciously discover erroneous rules and possibly suppress 
the  nonconscious  abstraction of  the  correct   rules. 
Once again, experiments using different learning 
paradigms support these results on the differences between 
explicit rule search and implicit abstraction. Using a 
serial learning format, Jones (1973) instructed subjects to 
anticipate the next number in a sequence of 24 digits. 
These subjects took much longer to learn the sequence than 
subjects who were told simply to study the numbers as they 
appeared. Baron     (1975)     had     subjects     memorize     paired 
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associate lists afi er being explicitly loJd 1he association 
ruJes thai re] at ed the stjmu]j to their responses- These 
subjects took longer and made more errors than subjects who 
were mere]y toJd to memorize the lists. In both 
experiments, explicit attempts 1o use or discover rules 
slowed subjeels down and increased their recall error rate 
relative to subjects who merely observed or memorized the 
stimuli. Thus conscious knowledge of the existence of 
rules is not only unnecessary for implicit learning (Baron 
& Hodge, 1978), it can be detrimental to nonconscious 
1earni ng. 
Subjects need not be told about the existence of the 
rules in order for conscious processes to intrude upon 
effective implicit learning, however. In an experiment by 
Howard and Bal1 as (1980), subjects experienced increased 
difficulty in learning FSG generated nonspeech sound 
sequences when the sounds were real-world noises instead of 
pure tones. Learning real-world sound sequences also 
resulted in poorer discrimination of grammatical and 
nongrammatical sequences than did learning tones. The 
subjects reported that being able to identify the sounds 
led to confusion when they tried to link typically 
unrelated sounds together in the sequences. The nature of 
the real-world stimuli prompted explicit "search and 
identify" activities that interfered with implicit 
absorption of  the  underlying   rule   structure. 
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In  order   for  implicit   learning  to  occur,   then,     it      is 
necessary     for     the     stimuli      to     possess  regularities  of  a 
sufficiently  complex   and     unfamiliar  nature     that      subjects 
do     not      try     to     conscious]y     induce     the  underlying  rules 
(Brooks,   1978;   Reber,   el      a].,      1980).        If     explicit      rule 
search     is     to be  effective,   the   stimulus  regularities must 
be   salient   to  the  subject .     Reber,   et   al .   (1980)     attempted 
to    make    the     underlying     PSG     structure    more     salient   by 
mounting  the  acquisition  strings  on  a  board  in  a  systematic 
order     (salient   board).     Each  column of  strings  represented 
a  different   subset   of grammatical      items:     those     beginning 
with    T     and     ending     with     W,     those beginning with  P and 
ending  with  VV,   etc.   A second board was  prepared     with     the 
strings     mounted     in  random order   (random board).     Subjects 
were  given one     of     the     two     boards     and     told     either     to 
memorize     the   strings   (implicit   group)   or  t o   figure   out   the 
rules  and use  them  to help  remember the     strings     (explicit 
group).      All      subjects  then took  the  discrimination  test   of 
previously unseen grammatical      strings     and     nongrammat i cal 
strings      (single     letter  FSG violations).     Results   showed   a 
strong     salience    by     instruction     interaction,     with       the 
explicit     group     subjects     performing     significantly better 
than all   other  subjects  on  the discrimination task  if     they 
worked with       the       saliently       organized       board,        but 
significantly more  poorly than  all   other   subjects     if     they 
used       the       randomly       organized     board     to    memorize     the 
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acquisition items. It appears that explicit rule search 
can be effective on complex, probabilistic stimuli if the 
i nt ra-rel at i onships in the stimuli are available to the 
subject; the nature of the presentation (salient board) 
reduced the complexity of the stimuli to a ^evel where 
subjects did not need to group the patterns into like sets 
and  could   simply  analyze  the  presented  groupings. 
To check on response consistency, the items in the 
discrimination test were repeated. The highest double- 
error rate was found in the random board, explicit 
instruction subjects, indicating that their active search 
had 1ed to discovering invalid rules. The highesl double- 
correct rate occurred in the explicit instruction, salient 
board   subjects,   presumably because they learned more  rules. 
An Analog  Interpretation 
It could also be argued that the salient board 
organization in the Reber et al. experiment (1980) provided 
explicit instruction subjects with a better memory chunking 
system for the acquisition strings. Their superior 
performance on the discrimination task would then be due 
not to knowing more rules but to retaining and being able 
to access more grammatical acquisition strings. These 
strings could be compared with a new string to determine 
its degree of similarity to grammatical items (Brit ton, 
1980;     Brooks,      1978);     no     knowledge     of the  grammar  rules 
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would be necessary. 
This Jailer theory proposes that subjects are 
determining the grammatical or nongrammaiica] nal ure of 
discrimination strings by means of analogy to remembered 
grammal icaJ        strings. This     is     a     nonanalytic     process 
requiring storage of individual instances. The separate 
aspects of the stimulus are not broken down and stored as 
rules or Jaws; the entire stimulus item is retained. The 
analogy theory thus requires only storage of the items, and 
does not require processing during acquisition. Reber's 
implicit abstraction theory requires that the items be 
analyzed nonconsciously during acquisition, and the 
individual items are not retained. According to implicit 
abstraction, a new item is classified by comparison to the 
remembered       rules. Under       the       analogy       theory,      the 
similarities between the new item and stored exemplars are 
analyzed, and if the match is close enough, the item will 
be classified as being of the same type as the exemplars. 
One problem wi t h t he analogy t heory i s t hat a new i t em 
could be misclassified if there were no exemplars in memory 
analogous to it. The analogy theory does allow greater 
flexibility should category requirements change, since the 
stored exemplars need only be reshuffled; under implicit 
abstraction the entire abstract rule system would have to 
be reworked. 
Brooks   (1978)   performed  a paired  associate task    which 
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demonstrates implicit learning by analogy. Two paired 
associate lists of letter siring siimuli were made up using 
1 wo FSGs. The responses were all either cities or animals, 
but this obvious division was not what distinguished the 
two grammars. Grammar A items were associated with "old 
world" responses (such as Rome and elephant), and grammar B 
items with "new world" responses (such as Chicago and 
buffalo). After learning the responses to both lists (in 
random order), subjects were told about the new/old world 
response distinction and then took a discrimination test in 
which they sorted new strings into three piles. One third 
of the discrimination strings were "old world" strings 
(grammar A), one third were "new world" strings (grammar 
B), and one third were strings acceptable by neither FSG. 
Subjects could discriminate grammars A and B from each 
other and from the nongrammat i cal strings at a rate 
significantly  above  chance   (an  average of  60%   correct). 
Using control groups, Brooks showed the two FSGs were 
not distinguishable without consistently correlated 
responses. Since subjects did not know that there were two 
types of items during acquisition (except for the obvious 
but erroneous city/animal response distinction), it was 
unlikely that they were correctly extracting the two 
different FSG rule structures. To emphasize this point , 
Brooks repeated the experiment, this time associating 
grammar A items with  city  responses     and    grammar     B     items 
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wi t h animal responses. If subjeds develop ruJes sysl ems, 
having more obvious cat egori es should result jn greaier 
ability io J earn the rules. In reality, subjeds performed 
at a level that was not significantly different from the 
previous experiment . Since increasing the salience of the 
category distinction did not increase the amount of 
learning, implicit abstraction of the underlying rule 
system may not be necessary for significant discriminatory 
ability in a paired associate learning task. Because the 
obscure new/old world response organization provided 
results similar to the more obvious animal/city 
organization, it is clear that response regularity need not 
be obvious to the subject during the learning phase. 
Brooks proposes that subjects were memorizing the 
individual acquisition items, and using these individual 
instances to draw analogies with the discrimination items. 
In this way, subjects need not know the response categories 
at acquisition. Once informed about the relevant 
categories, subjects would be able to retrieve memory items 
analogous to test items and interpret the exemplar item 
responses  to predict   a  category  for  the  test   item. 
Brooks   also points  out   that      subjects     need     not      have 
perfect     memory     for     individual      instances.      If     a  subject 
retrieves   from memory  an  item  that   resembles  the  test      item 
but is       incomplete,        his/her       chances       for       correct 
categorization depend  on     whether     the     forgotten     data     is 
22 
relevant or jrre]evant. If a retrieved jtem has four 
dimensions and the vaJ ue of one of -them is unknown, the 
subject still has a 75% chance of having retrieved an item 
that is correctly analogous to the test item. The limiting 
factor on analogical comparisons is having enough stored 
representative instances which are as complete as possible; 
perfect memory is not a requirement for success above 
chance  1evels. 
Analogy versus  Impl ici t   Abst ract i on 
Unfortunately, because Brooks' analogy theory is based 
upon a different experimental learning paradigm than 
Reber's implicit abstraction theory (paired associate 
learning versus memorization learning), it is not clear 
whether these theories are describing the same implicit 
learning phenomena. Several studies have been performed in 
an effort to discriminate.between the analogy and implicit 
abstraction processes. 
Baron and Hodge (1978) performed one such experiment 
using spelling-sound correspondences. Subjects learned to 
pronounce nonsense words written in an artificial alphabet. 
One set of acquisition words was consistent, with one 
letter corresponding to only one phoneme throughout the 
se1 . Another acquisition set was inconsistent, with a 
given letter having different sounds in different words. 
Both     sets    had  similar  letter  stimuli   and  sound  responses, 
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and were consl ruct ed so that a]] responses in a set had at 
least one phoneme-1etter combination in common. The 
analogy theory wouJd predict the consistent phoneme-J et t er 
pattern could lead to high transfer performance despite 
inconsistencies in the set, since subjects could simply 
search for items with analogous letters. The analogy theory 
thus would predict that the two sets should result in equal 
amounts of learning, as evidenced by the ability to 
pronounce a new word correctly. Implicit rule abstraction 
predicts the consistent set would result in more accurate 
rule learning and greater transfer accuracy; consistency is 
a requirement for accurate rule abstraction (Nagata, 1981). 
Results showed no significant differences in ability to 
pronounce new words between the consistent and inconsistent 
acquisition groups, in contradiction to the implicit 
abstraction theory. 
The analogy versus implicit abstraction argument was 
also studied in work done on fuzzy categories by Medin and 
Schaffer (1978) and Medin and Smith (1981). Two categories 
were constructed so that no one item feature, such as 
color or shape, was associated strictly with any one 
category. Items within a category were constructed t o be 
more analogous to each other than to items in the other 
category. However, all items were the same in terms of 
average similarity to either category prototype. It was 
assumed       in    this     experiment      that     implicit     abstraction 
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results in a set of rules for which 1 he cat egory prototype 
is the best possible example. Subjects were first required 
to learn an acquisition set of items from both categories. 
As each item was shown, subjects responded by guessing 
that the item belonged in either Category A or Category B. 
The correct category was then identified. The list of items 
was presented until the subject met the criterion of one 
errorless trial, or until a maximum of 32 trials was 
reached. The subject then sorted the discrimination items 
into two groups. The prototype model (adding distinctive 
features) would predict random category assignments because 
all items are equidistant from both prototypes. The 
analogy model predicts specific category assignments based 
on the number of analogous stored exemplars; the category 
with the greatest number of remembered exemplars analogous 
to the stimulus item will be the category chosen. Results 
showed greatest support for the analogy model of exemplar 
compari son. 
Subjects were also asked to identify the 
discrimination items as new (not seen before) or old (seen 
during acquisition). The analogy model predids thai the 
greater the number of stored exemplars analogous to a new 
stimulus item, the more likely it will be falsely 
classified as an old item. Prototype theory predicts 
erroneous classification on the basis of closeness to the 
prototype;  since  all  items  are  equally  close  to  all 
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prototypes,   they  should  all   have the     same     probability    of 
being     falsely     recognized     as     o3 d     items.        Results   again 
showed   significantJy     dissimilar     responses     to     individual 
items,   supporting  the  anaJogy theory of  stored  exemplars  in 
decision making. 
AJ J three of the above experiments {Baron & Hodge, 
1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Medin & Smith, 1981) seem to 
lend credence to the analogy theory. Reber, however, does 
no1 agree that the ana]ogy theory is completeJy applicable 
t o al 1 of implicit learning. When subjects attempted io 
solve FSG anagrams (Reber & Lewis 1977), the best 
predictor of performance was a model based on the frequency 
of letter pairs (bi grams) occurring in the entire set of 
grammatical strings. The bigram frequency pattern of the 
acquisition string subset did not correlate with 
performance at all. Since the acquisition strings composed 
the subjects' potential analogy set, it is piain that 
simple     rote     memory     for     items     does     not account        for 
performance     which    was     correlated     with     knowledge  of the 
entire  PSG's  bigram  frequencies. 
Similarly, an experiment by Reber (1969), in which he 
manipulated FSG syntax and symbols, points strongly towards 
rule system knowledge ra1her than exemplar knowledge. 
After memorizing an acquisition set, subjects were asked to 
learn a new set of strings which differed from the original 
set      either     in     syntax     (new FSG)   or   symbols   (new letters, 
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same FSG). If subjecis rely on exemplar storage to detect 
consjslencies, either a symbol change or a syntax change 
should produce a comparable number of errors since new 
strings would have little in common on the surface with the 
acquisition items. If subjects abstract at ]east part of 
the underlying ruJ e structure, then they should recognize 
the consistency in the rules despite a surface symbol 
change, and should produce fewer errors when learning the 
new set of items. The results showed that subjects made 
significantly fewer errors when learning the new symbol, 
same FSG items than when learning the new FSG items. In 
addition, the symbol change subjects quickly decreased 
their error rate to their lowest acquisition error rate. 
These subjects were able to exploit their knowledge of the 
rules from the acquisition set to speed 1earning of the new 
set   of  items. 
Paired Associate  versus   Observational   Learning 
The fact that support can be found for either theory 
(implicit abstraction or analogy) can be traced to the 
learning     paradigms     used     in     the     experiments. Results 
supporting the analogy theory come from paired associate 
learning studies (Baron & Hodge, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Medin & Smith, 1981), whereas results supporting the 
implicit abstraction theory come from memorization and/or 
observational   learning   studies   (Reber,   1969;   Reber  &  Lewis, 
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1977). The inclusion of responses and/or response feedback 
during acquisition seems to effect the type of learning 
involved. Reber and A]3 en (1978) performed an experiment 
designed to compare the degree and types of ]earning 
resulting from the paired associaie and observational 
paradigms. Subjects learned PSG items either, by "attending 
to them" {implicit abstraction), or by learning 1 he city 
responses paired with the strings (paired associate 
learning). The implicit abstraclion subjecls were able to 
decrease their recall error rate over learning trials, bul 
the paired associate subjects did not decrease their errors 
and some subjects even increased the number of recall 
errors as the number of items to be remembered increased 
over trials. The two groups reported very different 
processing styles during the acquisition phase. Paired 
associate subjects admitted to using gimmicks and mnemonics 
when remembering the city-string pairings. In contrast, 
the implicit abstraction subjects claimed to be using more 
who!istic   scanning/acoustical   methods. 
The true test of the two reported learning methods 
came afl er acquisition. Paired associate subjects were 
asked to identify the discrimination s1rings as allowable 
"cities" or "not cities", and 1 he implicit abstraction 
subjed s judged the well-formedness (grammatical or 
nongrammaiical ) of the strings. Despite the fact that the 
paired  associate  subjects  received  two times more     exposure 
28 
lo ihe acquisition strings ihan did 1 he implicit 
abstraction subjects, the ] at t er performed significantly 
better at        identifying       grammatical        items       on       the 
discrimination task. Paired associate subject performance, 
whiJe above chance levels on the average, decreased 
significantly during the discrimination test, possibly due 
to the decay of analogy exemplars from short term memory. 
If stored exemplars do indeed have a limited life span, 
then subjects who learn by the analogy method should be at 
a disadvantage as time passes by and they forget what they 
have  1 earned. 
The life span of exemplar memory was tested in a two 
year follow-up study by Allen and Reber (1980). Subjects 
from their 1978 study repeated the discrimination task 
without any review of the original acquisition items. The 
discrimination items consisted of both novel (previously 
unseen) and old (seen in acquisition) strings. While both 
groups exhibited decreased performance from their original 
levels, they were still above chance in their ability to 
identify grammatical and nongrammat i cal strings (an average 
of 67% correct ). There was no overall scoring difference 
between the paired associate and implicit abstraction 
subjects, but the implicit abstraction subjects in general 
were more accurate on the novel items, and the paired 
associate subjects were more accurate on the old items. 
These  differences were   significant. 
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The   two year   follow-up  results   seem  io     indicate     that 
implicit   abstraction   subjects processed  the  acquisition   set 
at      a     deeper,     more     gjobal      3 eve]      than     did     the     paired 
associate     subjects,      who     were     mainly  trying  to  est ab] i sh 
memory  links  between  items.     ImpJicit   abstraction  seems     to 
aid     subjects     in     identifying  novel   grammat i cal   strings  by 
comparison to abstract   rules,   while     the     paired     associate 
storage     of     exemplars  during  acquisition  gives   subjects   an 
advantage on  identifying previous]y     seen     items     (A]]en     & 
Reber,        1980;     Matsuda     &     Robbins,      1977).     Both    methods 
resulted     in     implicit      learning:     there     was     no     explicit 
analysis,      subjects     could     not      verbalize  how they knew an 
item was  grammatical,   and    performance     indicated     accurate 
knowledge     of the  stimulus   structure   (Reber  &  Allen,   1978). 
Furthermore,   both     forms     of     implicit      learning     (implicit 
abstraction     and  analogy)   were  robust   enough to  allow above 
chance performance  two  years  laler,     despite    the     lack     of 
rehearsal   opportunity. 
Implicit learning has thus been shown to occur under a 
variety of conditions, from active memorization (Brooks, 
1978; Jones, 1977; Reber, 1967, 1969; Reber & Allen, 1978) 
to simple observation (Reber & Allen, 1978). The 
differences in type and degree of learning seem to be keyed 
to the structure of the task required of the subjects 
(Simon, 1975). The task organization provided by the 
experimenter   (paired   associate  learning  versus  observation) 
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may predispose subjects toward par! icu]ar learning 
strategies (Martin & Noreen, 1974; Matsuda & Robbins, 1977; 
Medin & Smith, 1981). On the other hand, the nature of the 
task may simply make certain aspects of the stimuli more 
salient to subjects: paired associate Jearning may 
emphasize symbols, observationaJ learning may emphasize 
patterns (Weiner-EhrlJch, Bart, & Millward, 1980; Winston, 
1978). Experience with the learning paradigm may also play 
a significant roJe. It could be argued that subjects have 
had much more experience with observational learning (a 
process that could be operating almost continuously in 
daily life) than with paired associate learning. The more 
experience one has with a particular learning paradigm, the 
more likely it may be that one is capable of extracting the 
majority of the information as quickly as possible 
(implicit abstraction). Less experience with the paradigm 
may require a more careful study of individual items, 
predisposing   subjects  to   store   individual   exemplars. 
Experiment   !_ 
Because Reber's observational/memorization learning 
paradigm is the only experimental paradigm to provide 
results strongly in support of the implicit abstraction 
theory rather than the analogy theory, it is important to 
ascertain that subject behavior under this paradigm is not 
due  solely to  learning  occurring  outside of  the  acquisition 
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phase. Experiment 1 introduces coni ro] groups into Reber's 
learning paradigm for this reason. Reber did not use 
controJ groups, instead he relied on chance ]eveJs of 
performance as his baseJine. Since subjects could classdfy 
■the ddscrdmdnatdon items as gramrnat d cal or nongrammal j ca] , 
the probabdlity that they would be correct "by chance" was 
0.50. Thds strategy presumed that subjects brought no 
knowledge to the experiment that would enable them to make- 
systematic and potentially accurate guesses on the 
discrimination task. In Experiment. 1, the validity of this 
assumption was tested by usdng two control groups: only 
nongrammatical (random) acqudsdtion exposure and no 
acqudsdtion exposure. The performance of these control 
subjects on the discrimination task should provide 
dnformatdon about the true level of correct responses 
possdble by undnformed subjects. This ievel might be above 
or below Reber's baseline  level   of  50%   (chance). 
Me1 hod 
Pi f t y-one male subjects from the introductory 
psychology subject pool were randomly assigned to one of 
three exposure (acquisition) groups: grammatical, 
nongrammatdcal, or no exposure. Acquisition items for the 
grammatical exposure group were derived from the FSG dn 
Figure 1. This is the same grammar used by Reber (1967, 
Reber  &  Lewis,  1977).   Acceptable   grammatical   items 
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consist ed       of       all strings       of     length     3-8.        Fi f i een 
grammatical   strings  which sample  aJ J   of     the     possible     FSG 
paths     (the     same     15   used by  Reber  &  Lewis,   1977)   composed 
the  grammatical   exposure  acquisition   set.     The     grammatdeal 
items     were    presented   in a different   random  order   for  each 
grammatical   exposure   subject . 
The f i f 1 een nongrammat i cal s1 rings of length 3-8 for 
the nongrammatical exposure acquisition set were randomly 
generated using the same letters as in the FSG. There were 
no restrictions on the random items except that they could 
not be grammatical. Each nongrammatical exposure subject 
viewed a different random order of the nongrammatjcal 
i t ems. 
Grammatical and nongrammatical subjects were informed 
that they were part of a memory experiment, and would be 
memorizing 15 items. The strings were presented in 5 sets 
of 3 .strings each. The 3 strings in each set were 
presented one at a time on a CRT screen (cathode ray tube 
computer terminal) for 5 seconds each. Af1 er viewing all 3 
strings, subjects were asked to type in the strings via a 
keypad. Subjects could enter the strings in any order, and 
were informed for each string whether they were correct or 
incorrect, but were not 1 ol d the nature of the error. If 
the subject did not correctly remember all 3 strings, the 
set was presented again as before and the subject attempted 
to  correctly enter  the   strings.     This  process was     repeated 
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unt i 1 the subject correctly eni ered a]] 3 strings in a set 
during the same 1rj a] . The subjeel then proceeded to the 
next set of 3 strings. The no exposure subjects did not 
participate  i n  t he  acquisition phase  of the  experimenl . 
A]] subjects were then informed about the exislence of 
a rul e system which would specify allowable J et t er 
pal terns, but were not t o] d the exact nature of the rules. 
Grammatjcal and nongrammaticaJ exposure subjects were told 
they had learned rule/random iiems respectively. All 
subjects then were told about the discrimination items: 
ha]f would be previously unseen grammati cal strings, and 
half would be previously unseen nongrammaticaJ (random) 
strings. The discrimination set consisted of 28 acceptable 
grammatical strings nol used in acquisition and 28 
randomly created nongrammatical strings also not used in 
acquisition. The strings were presented in a different 
random order for each subject on a CRT screen. Only one 
string was visible at any given time. For each string, 
subjects were instructed to press a button marked "YES" if 
the string was considered to be grammatical (follows 
rules), or to press a button marked "NO" for nongrammatical 
(random)   strings.     Response   latency was  not   timed. 
Result s 
Discrimination responses of  "YES"  and  "NO"  by the 
subjects  were  scored by assigning a value of 1 (one) for 
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each   correct   response   (grammatica]   jlem  and   "YES"     response 
or     nongrammaiica]   item  and   "NO"   response)   and  a  value  of  0 
(zero)   for  each     incorrect      response.        The     lota]     percent 
correct        on     the     two     types     of     items     (grammaiica]      and 
nongrammaticaJ        categories)        for       each       exposure       type 
(grammatical,     nongrammatica]      and  no  exposure)   is   shown   in 
Tab]e     1.        The     nongrammat i cal      and     no     exposure       groups 
performed  at    simiJar  ]eve]s  on  the  discrimination  task,   and 
correctJy     identified     approximate]y     the     same     number     of 
grammatjcaJ      and     nongrammaiica]      items.        The     grammatical 
subjects were better at   identifying  the     grammai i ca]      items 
than     the     nongrammaiica]   items,   and were  better  overaJJ   at 
the  discrimination  task  than     either     of     the     two     coni roJ 
groups. 
Tab] e 1 
Percent Correct Scores by Cat egory 
With Grammatica], Nongrammaiica] and No Exposure 
Exposure 
Cat egory     Grammat i ca]      Nongrammat i ca]       No 
Grammatica] 82 56 61 
Nongrammaiica]      70 58 58 
P]anned comparisons were done on the exposure groups 
and the exposure by category interaction. WhiJe the two 
contro] groups (nongrammaiica] and no exposure) did not 
significantly differ from each other (F(l,48)=0.60, p> . 05 ), 
the grammatica] exposure group was significantly  different 
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from both of the controls (F(l,48)«41.68, p<.Ol). The 
exposure by category interaction was a]so significant for 
the grammatica] exposure group versus the two controJs 
(F(l,48)=6.32, p<.05), and was not significant when the two 
controls were compared (F(l,48)=0.54, p>.05) . A]J of the 
individual ce] 3 averages in Table 1 were significantly 
above chance levels according to t-tests. An analysis of 
variance on the data (see Appendix A for the model, mean 
squares and ANOVA summary table) showed a significant item 
effect (F(54,2592)=4.07, p<.01) and a significant exposure 
by item interaction (F(108,2592)=1.42, p<.05). 
A second analysis of variance was performed, assuming 
that the individual grammatical and nongrammat i cal items 
were random rather than fixed factors (see Appendix B for 
the model, mean squares and ANOVA summary table). The 
purpose of this assumption was for prediction and 
generalization purposes; it is acknowledged that in this 
design the items were indeed fixed factors. Comparisons on 
the exposure and exposure by category effects using this 
model resulted in quasi-F's. Only the comparison of 
grammatical exposure versus the two control groups 
(nongrammatical and no exposure) was significant 
(F(l,107)=26.12, p<.01). Both items and subjects were 
significant effects under this analysis (F(54,2592)=4.07 
and F(48,2592)=2.32 respectively, both p<.01). Also 
significant were the exposure by  items  and  category by 
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subjects interactions        (F{108,2592)=1.42,        p<.05       and 
F(48,2592)=1.76,   p<.01   respectively). 
Data from the acquisition phase were compared for the 
grammatical and nongrammatical exposure groups. No 
differences were found between the two groups on the number 
of t ri aJ s per set needed to meet criterion. The main 
effect      for     sets       was       the       onJy       significant effect 
(F{4,128)=4.15,        p<.01). Comparisons        for     linear     and 
curvilinear trends   showed  this  to be  due  to  a  strong   linear 
Table   2 
Mean  Number  of  Trials  per  Acquisition  Set 
Sets 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.18 4.94 4.15 3.12 3.41 
decrease over sets in number of trials to criterion, as 
can be seen in Table 2 (F(l,128)=14.46, p<.01 for linear, 
F(3,128)=0.71,   p>.05   for  curvilinear). 
Experiment   2 
Results from Experiment 1 show that implicit learning 
does indeed take place. Grammatical exposure subjects were 
significantly better on the discrimination task than the 
controls. However, the results also demonstrate that 
chance is not an accurate baseline when determining the 
extent     of    implicit      learning     during  acquisition;   control 
37 
group subjecis, who had  no  exposure  io  the  FSG  during 
acquisition,  performed  significantly  above  chance  when 
discriminating grammatical and nongrammatical  items.   The 
control  group  subjects  appear  able  to make systematic 
guesses  about  the  discrimination  items,  despite  their 
presumed Jack of ruJe knowledge and experience.  Experiment 
2  was  designed  to  further  explore   the   effects   of 
noninstances (nongrammatical items) seen during acquisition 
on discriminatory strategies, as  we]]  as  the  effect  of 
total   nongrammatical   exposure , during  acquisition  on 
discrimination performance.  Two new types  of  acquisition 
exposure  were  used in addition to the all grammaticaJ and 
all nongrammatica] exposure groups from  Experiment  1:  an 
acquisition  set with predominantly grammatical items and a 
few nongrammatica] items,  and  a  set  with  predominantly 
nongrammatica]  items  and a few grammatical items.  It was 
hypothesized   that   a  mixture   of  grammatical    and 
nongrammat ica]  acquisition items might interfere with rule 
abstraction due t o t he inconsistencies between items in the 
acquisition  set.  Subjects viewing a mixed acquisition set 
were  expected  to   demonstrate   discriminatory  ability 
somewhere   between   that   of  the  control  group  (all 
nongrammatical exposure) and the all  grammatical  exposure 
group. 
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Method 
Forty-eight ma] e subjects from the introductory psychology 
subject poo] were random]y assigned to one of four exposure 
(acquisition)  groups:  100%,  80%,  40%,  and   0%.    The 
percentages  indicate  the proportion of the 15 grammatica] 
acquisition strings from Experiment 1 seen by  the  subject 
during   the  acquisition  phase.   Fifteen  nongrammat i caJ 
strings were random]y created using the same letters as  in 
the  FSG,  and  were  matched to the grammat i ca] strings in 
terms of proportion of items of ]ength 3-8.  Subjects   saw 
(100-x%) of these nongrammaticaJ strings, where x indicates 
the amount of grammatica] exposure. Thus,  the  100%  group 
saw a]]  grammatica]  items,  and  the  0%  group  saw a]] 
nongrammatica] items.  A different  random  combination  of 
grammat i caJ  and  nongrammat i ca]  strings conforming to the 
required percentages was selected for each subject  in  the 
80%  and  40%  groups.  The acquisition sets were presented 
exactly as in Experiment 1,  using  the  criterion  of  one 
correct  reproduction  of a]] 3 strings in a set during the 
same t ri a] . 
After acquisition, a]] subjects  were  informed  about 
the  existence  of  a  rule  system,  and  were  told  what 
percentages of the items they had  learned  had  been  rule 
created and randomly created.  They then performed the same 
discrimination task as in Experiment 1, except that the  28 
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nongrammatica] items were adjusted so t hai item length was 
matched with the item lengths of the grammat j ca] 
discrimination  items. 
Resu]t s 
The mean number of trjaJs to criterion per acquisition 
set showed a scattered pattern, with the different exposure 
groups experiencing their poorest average performance 
(highest mean number of trials to criterion) on different 
sets. In general, however, performance on the fifth set 
was   improved  over  performance  on  the   first   and  second   sets, 
Tabl e 3 
Mean Number of Trials per Acquisition Set 
With 100%, 80%, 40% and 0% Grammatical Exposure 
E xpos ure 
Set 
Set 100% 80% 40% 0% Mean 
1 5.00 9.50 5.92 5.67 6.52 
2 5.58 5.08 7.42 7.75 6.46 
3 7.08 4.67 5.83 5.00 5.65 
4 5.17 4.75 6.08 4.00 5.00 
5 4.75 2.75 5.17 5.58 4.56 
as can be seen by the reduced number of trials required to 
reach criterion on the fifth set (see Table 3). No 
differences were found between the four groups on number 
of trials per set, but the set by exposure i nt eract i on was 
significant (F(12,176)=2.06, p<.05). Planned comparisons 
for  linear  and  curvilinear trends on the main effect for 
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seis showed a strong Jinear decrease over sets in number 
of trja]s to criterion (F(1,176)=10.76, p<.01 for Jinear, 
F(3,176)=0.16, p>.05 for curviJinear). 
The subjects' discrimination responses  of  "YES"  and 
"NO"  were  scored by assigning a value of 1 (one) for each 
correct response (grammatical item and  "YES"  response  or 
nongrammaticaJ  item  and  "NO"  response) and a value of 0 
(zero) for each incorred  response.   The   total  percent 
correci   on  the  two  types  of  items  (grammatical  and 
nongrammatical categories) for each exposure  group  (100%, 
80%,  40%,   and  0%)  are shown in Tab]e 4.  A]] subjects, 
regardless of exposure type, were better at  discriminating 
grammatical    items    than   at   correctly   identifying 
nongrammatical items.  There  is  a   decrease  in  percent 
correct  as  the  amount of grammatical exposure decreases. 
All  percent correct scores in Table 4  were  significantly 
above chance according to t-tests. 
Planned comparisons were done on the  exposure  groups 
and the exposure by category interaction. While the 80% and 
Tab!e 4 
Percent Correct Scores by Cat egory 
With 100%, 80%, 40% and 0% Grammatical Exposure 
Cat egory 100% 
Exposure 
80% 40% 0% 
Grammat i cal 
Nongrammat ical 
76 
70 
67 
55 
63 
57 
58 
54 
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40% exposure groups did not sjgnif3cant1y differ from each 
01 her (F(l,44)=0.02, p>.05), 1 he 100% exposure group was 
significantly different from the average of the 80% and 40% 
groups (F(l,44)=10.94, p<.01) and a]] three were 
significantly unlike the 0% exposure group (F(1,44)=5.87, 
p<.05). A nonorthogonal comparison of the 0% exposure 
group with the average of the 40% and 80% groups was not 
significant (F(l,44)=1.40, p>.05). None of the exposure by 
category interaction comparisons were significant. An 
analysis of variance on the data (see Appendix C for the 
model, mean squares and ANOVA summary table) resulted in a 
significant category effect (F(l,44)=5.36, p<.05), item 
effect (F{54,2376)=2.68, p<.01) and exposure by item 
interaction (F(162,2376)=1.32, p<.01). 
A second analysis of variance was performed, assuming 
that the individual grammatical and nongrammatical items 
were random rather than fixed factors {see Appendix D for 
the model, mean squares and ANOVA summary table). Again, 
the purpose of this assumption was for prediction and 
generalization purposes; it is acknowledged that in this 
design the items were fixed factors. Comparisons on the 
exposure and exposure by category effects using this model 
resulted in quasi-Fs. The exposure comparisons again 
showed a significant difference between the 100% and the 
average of the 80% and 40% exposure groups (F{1,85)=7.90, 
p<.01)  and  between  all three of the preceding groups and 
42 
the 0% exposure group (F(l,85)=4.34, p<.05). The 
comparisons on the 80% group versus the 40% group and the 
0% group versus the average of the 80% and 40% groups were 
still nonsignificant (F{1,85)=0.24 and F(l,85)=1.20 
respectively, both p>.05). Both the item and subject ma i n 
effects were significant under this analysis 
(F(54,2376)=2.68 and F(44,2376)=3.11 respectively, both 
p<.01). Also significant were the exposure by items and 
category by subjects interactions (F(152,2376)=1.32 and 
F(44,2376)=2.70 respectively, both p<.01). 
Since subjects were only told that two categories 
existed on the discrimination task, and were not given 
explicit examples of either category, it is possible that a 
Table 5 
Percent Correct Scores for Straight Scoring and 
Maximizing Scoring with 100%, 80%, 40% and 0% Exposure 
Exposure 
Scoring        100%        80%        40% 0% 
straight 73 61 60 56 
maximizing       74 64 62 56 
subject might have consistently called grammatical items 
nongrammatical, and vice versa. In order to allow for 
category confusions by the subjects, the data were 
rescored. Subjects were considered to have reversed 
categories if the number of grammatical items called 
grammatical   (GG   score)   summed  with the  number of 
43 
nongrammal i caJ i terns caJ J ed nongrammatica] (NN score) was 
Jess than the sum of the grammat icaJ items caJ ] ed 
nongrarnmal ica] (GN score) and nongrammat i caJ items caJ J ed 
grammatical (NG score). In addition, the GG and NN scores 
had to be Jess than the GN and NG scores, respectiveJy. 
This eliminated the possibiJity of rescoring a subjeel who 
correctJy categorized a Jarge percentage of nongrammaticaJ 
items but few of the grammatical items (or vice versa). 
There were 6 subjects who met the criteria for rescoring: 
one each in the 100% and 0% exposure" groups, and two each 
in the 80% and 40% exposure groups. Their responses were 
rescored assuming that an answer of "YES" (grammaticaJ) to 
a nongrammaticaJ item and a "NO" (nongrammaticaJ) response 
to a grammalicaJ item were the correct categorizations. The 
TabJ e 6 
Percent Correct Scores by Cat egory 
With 100%, 80%, 40% and 0% GrammaticaJ Exposure 
With Maximizing Scoring 
Exposure 
Category       100%        80%        40% 0% 
GrammaticaJ 77 68 66 57 
NongrammaticaJ      70 60 58 56 
original totaJ percent  correct  for  each  exposure  group 
(straight  scoring)  and  the revised totaJ percent correct 
for each exposure group (maximizing scoring) are  shown  in 
TabJe   5.    The   decrease   in  scores  with  decreased 
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grammat i cal exposure  is  slightly more  pronounced  af1 er 
rescoring. 
Revised total percent correct on the two types of 
items (gramma! i cal and nongrammatica] categories) for each 
exposure type (100%, 80%, 40%, and 0%) are shown jn Table 
6. The rescored data were analyzed twice: once assuming 
items as a fixed factor, and once with items as a random 
factor. The ANOVA summary tables for these analyses can be 
found in Appendix E. WhiJe the category, item and exposure 
by item effects were slightly weaker after rescoring, the 
exposure main effect was much stronger. Comparisons on 
exposure type found the 100% scores versus the average of 
the 80% and 40% group scores (F(l,44)=12.34 and 
F(l,107)=7.79 for the fixed and random effects models, 
respectively) and the average of the 100%, 80% and 40% 
group scores versus the 0% group scores (F(1,44)=12.38 and 
F(l,107)=7.82 for the fixed and random effects models 
respectively) both to be significant at the .01 2evei . The 
comparison of the 80% group with the 40% group was still 
not significant (F(l,44)=0.46 and F(1,107)=0.58 for the 
fixed and random models, respectively, both p>.05). The 
rescored data did result in a significant difference 
between the 0% exposure group and the average of the 40% 
and 80% groups under the items as a fixed effect model 
(F(l,44)=4,61, p<.05), but 1 he comparison was not 
significant  under  the  items  as  a  random  effect model 
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(F(l,107)=3.10, p>.05). The fact thai this comparison is 
significant in on]y one of four analyses (rescored data, 
i 1 ems as fixed effect) and is not significant when items 
are used as part of the error term (rescored data, items as 
random effect) makes the strength of this effect open to 
question. 11 is not clear that other subjects and/or other 
FSGs would result in a similar difference between the 0% 
exposure group and the two mixed exposure groups (80% and 
40%). In addition, since the comparison in question is 
only just significanl (the critical point for significance 
is 4.08), the experimenter does not feel it is justified to 
claim that the 80% and 40% groups could discriminate items 
at a significantly better rate than the 0% group. The 
current experimental results seem to indicate that the 
exposure groups with nongrammatical items (noninstances) in 
acquisition (30%, 40% and 0%) all performed at about the 
same  level   on the  discrimination  task. 
Pi scussi on 
In both of the experiments presented here, exposure 
during acquisition that consisted of all grammatical items 
resulted in significantly increased ability to discriminate 
grammatical from nongrammat i cal items rel alive to subjects 
with no exposure, all nongrammatical, or mixed grammatical 
and nongrammal ical exposure. Thus the 100% grammatical 
exposure subjects do seem to be  able  to  learn  something 
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from their acquisition experience, and evidence that this 
is an implicit process comes largely from post-experiment al 
subject verbalizations; no subject was able to define rules 
accounting for the majority of his discriminatory behavior. 
ImpJicit learning has thus been demonstrated under certain 
rather narrow conditions. 
It should be noted that both of the preceding 
experiments used the same FSG. There is thus no 
experimental evidence to verify generalizations of these 
results to other FSGs. However, since both Reber (1969; 
Reber & Allen, 1978; Reber, et al., 1980) and Brooks (1978) 
have demonstrated implicit learning using other FSGs, it is 
probable that other complex rule systems would generate 
similar results. In addition, the fad that the items as 
random effects analyses that were performed resulted in 
significant exposure differences despite using items as 
part of the error term seems to indicate that these 
exposure effects are robust and not unique to the 
particular  FSG  items   used  in  these  experiments. 
Learning  Rates   During  Acquisition 
While  seeing  all   grammatical   items  during     acquisition 
does     seem  to help discriminatory ability,   it   does  not    seem 
to     be     beneficial      during     acquisition.        The     acquisition 
learning     rates     in     Experiments     1     and     2     do  no1    support 
Reber's   (1967)   findings  that   the     existence     of     a     set      of 
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rules a]J ows for a reduced number of errors over iriaJs. 
In both experiments, subjects did experience a Jinear 
redudion jn errors over i ria]s, but there were no 
differences between the different exposure groups. Since 
nongrammatical (0%) exposure subjects have no available 
ruJes to extract and use to aid memorizal ion, it seems 
probable that the reduction in errors is due to subjects 
Jearning how besl to approach the memorization task. 
Subjects appear to decide on a "3 earn one i t em al a time" 
strategy, memorizing one item in the sel first, then trying 
to remember two, then a]J three. The significant exposure 
by set interaction found in Experimenl 2 is difficult to 
explain, and seems to be due mostJy io ihe high mean number 
of tria]s (9.5) needed by the 80% exposure subjects on 
their   first   acquisition  set    {possib]e Type   I   error). 
The  Importance  of  Control   Groups 
WhiJe the amount of exposure to rule created items 
does not seem to affect learning rates, it does affect 
J at er performance at identifying novel grammatical items. 
The existence of implicit learning is supported by the 
significant increase in discriminatory ability shown by the 
grammatical exposure subjects in Experiment 1. However, 
bo*h the no exposure and nongrammatdeal exposure group 
subjects performed at a rate above chance, implying that 
Reber's  criterion of  significance  above  chance   (50%)   is     an 
48 
incorrect   baseline. 
The possibility that 0% exposure subjects in 
Experiment 2 scored above chance on the discrimination task 
because they were implicitly absorbing the ruJes during the 
discrimination task       was     investigated     in     a     post-hoc 
analysis of their first half and second half scores. If 
learning did occur during the discrimination task, then 
scores should improve with time and their second half 
scores should be better than their first half scores. No 
significant difference was found between first and second 
half scores (mean percent correct of 55% and 57% 
respectively, t{22)=0.48, two-tailed, p>.05). Rescoring of 
the 0% subject responses to give the maximum possible 
scores (see page 43) still did not result in a difference 
between first and second half scores on the discrimination 
task (mean percent correct of 55% and 58% respectively, 
t(22)=0.63, two-tailed, p>.05). On the basis of these 
results, it is not possible to argue that the subjects were 
implicitly absorbing the rules during the discrimination 
task, as this should result in better second half scores. 
While Reber (1967) did find evidence of learning during the 
discrimination phase, his subjects classified each 
discrimination i 1 em twice and thus had a greater amount of 
viewing time boih per item and overall. Subjects in 
Experiment 2 did not have this added time benefit and did 
not    exhibit   behavior  in  line with abstraction  of the  rules. 
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Since the above chance performance of the control 
groups appears not to be due to Jearnjng during the 
discrimination task, subject response patterns on the 
individual di scr iminat jon items were intuitively examined 
for clues to the subjects' discriminatory behavior. 
Examination of the individual strings and average exposure 
group responses to each string in Experiment 1 showed that 
nongrammatical and no exposure subjects did as we]1 as 
grammatical subjects on grammatical items that "looked 
regular", such as "TXXTTW" and "PTTVV" (see Appendix F) . 
The control group subjects were also good at correctly 
identifying "irregular" nongrammatical items such as "XPVS" 
and "PVVTSP". It appears that these subjects assumed a 
regular letter pattern (e.g. single letter, double letters, 
double letters) was indicative of rules, and irregular 
patterns of random generation. 
Experiment 2 results supported the hypothesis that 
subjed s with predominantly nongrammatical exposure use a 
"regular pattern" approach in identifying items (see 
Appendix G). The 0% and 40% exposure groups were better 
than the 100% and 80% exposure groups at identifying 
regularly patterned "TXXT..." strings as grammatical. The 
fact that the "TXXT" pattern was not found in any 
acquisition item helps to account for the poorer 
performance of the 100% and 80% exposure groups, but does 
not  explain  the  40%  and  0%  performance.  The 1 atter's 
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decision making processes become more obvious when it is 
noied that 40% and 0% exposure subjects were not better at 
classifying "TXXT..VPS" patterns as grammaticaJ . These 
patterns do not follow a regular, mathematical pattern of 
letters, whereas strings such as "TXXTW" and "TXXTTTW" do 
have a mathematical pattern (singl e-double-singl e-double 
and   single-double-triple-double patterns  respectively). 
Detecting pattern regularity or the lack thereof also 
may have helped the 0% and 40% subjects identify certain 
nongrammat i cal items correctly at a higher rate than the 
100% and 80% exposure subjects. Mathematically irregular 
nongrammat i cal items, which began with P or T (the two FSG 
allowable initial letters) and contained a few FSG 
allowable bigrams (such as W), fooled the subjects given 
greater grammatical exposure (100% and 80%) into 
identifying them as grammatical items. The 40% and 0% 
subjects, who appeared to be using a different criterion, 
were more likely to correctly classify these items as 
nongrammatical, possibly because of their of "lack of 
regul arit y." 
Further evidence that subjects did not always make 
discrimination decisions by using only FSG rules comes from 
an examination of those items which 100% exposure subjects 
correctly classified at a higher rate than all other 
subjects. The majority of these items contain "VPX" or 
"VPS".     Since  these trigrams  are  not   easily recognizable  as 
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grammatical by mat hemal i cal pai 1 em rules, grammal j ca] 
j terns containing them would be Jess likely to be correctly 
idenlified by less informed subjects (40%, and 0% exposure 
groups) who       were       using       mathematical (regularity) 
heuri st i cs . 
Subjects  with  little     or     no     previous     rule     exposure 
(nongrammatical,     no     exposure,     40%     and     0%   groups)     thus 
appear     able     to     correctly     detect      some     grammatical      and 
nongrammal i cal        items     on     the     basis     of     a     malhematical 
"regularity"     pattern    heuristic.        While       the       subjects' 
knowledge       of       probability       and     pattern     rules     is     not 
completely accurate   (see  Ni sbet t   &  Ross,   1980,      chapters     4 
and     5,   for  analyses  of  subjeel   perceptions  of randomness), 
even  a     partially     correct     heuristic     allows     subjects     to 
discriminate  some FSG items,   since by definition  acceptable 
grammatical   items    have    probabilistic     intra-relationships 
(Reber,   1967). 
While the above examination of the individual strings 
and the conclusions about subject behavior are all 
intuitively based, the fact remains that both experiments 
showed a significanl exposure by item interaction. This 
indicates thai subjeci s with different types of acquisition 
experience will respond to the individual discrimination 
strings in different ways. These response differences may 
not only be due to learning which occurred during 
acquisition,   but   also  to knowledge  about   patterns  and  their 
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formation possessed by the subjects prior io the 
experiment . Subjects in Allen and Reber's (19B0) two year 
follow-up study may have scored above chance on the 
discrimination task after a two year Jag not because they 
remembered the ruJes but because of simple guessing based 
on  regular patterns   and  probability  rules. 
Reber might argue that there is a key difference 
between his work and the current studies. Nongrammatical 
items in the current experiments were randomly created, 
whereas Reber's NG items were single letter FSG violations. 
Reber could propose that discriminating single letter FSG 
violations from the grammatical items requires a detailed 
knowledge of the rules. Uninformed subjects should be 
unable to perform at above chance levels simply because 
both the grammatical and nongrammatical items will be very 
similar in appearance. However, there is no way of knowing 
whether changing a single letter in a grammatical item 
(making it nongrammat i cal ) distorts the "regularity" of the 
item and thus makes it more likely to be called 
nongrammatdeal by uninformed subjects. While Reber may be 
right in assuming that chance is an accurate baseline for 
his experiments, he has not shown experimental evidence 
that the performance levels attained by his grammatical 
exposure subjects when making "fine" discriminations are 
beyond the performance levels possible for subjects without 
grammatical   exposure.     Without   the  proper  controls  to  set   a 
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systematic guessing baseline, the percenl age of correct 
responses on the discrimination task due to implicit 
1earning  is   unclear  in  Reber's  experiments. 
It should be noted that one cannot find an exposure by 
item interaction when the experiment has only one exposure 
group, as in Reber's studies. This is important, because 
the differing behavior on individual items from subjects 
with different acquisition exposure provides important 
clues to subject decision strategies. The significant 
exposure by item interaction also accounts for other 
significant effects which occur when using this learning 
paradigm, such as the significant item main effeci ; if 
subjects in a certain exposure group have a higher 
probability of correclly classifying certain items and a 
lower probability for other items, the overall item 
averages may well differ. The exposure by item interaction 
(items as fixed effect) can also account for the 
occasionally significant category main effect and category 
by exposure interactions found in Experiments 1 and 2, 
since strings are confounded with categories in this 
experimental   design. 
Nongrammat ical   Exposure  and   Implicit   Learning 
The effect of acquisition exposure to noninstances on 
later discriminalory ability can be seen in results from 
Experiment   2.     The  80%  and     40%     exposure     groups     were     in 
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genera] not able       lo       make        significant1y       belter 
discriminations  than     the     0%     exposure     group,      indicating 
that      the     former    were     not    able  to make   use  of  their   ruJe 
exposure     during     acquisition.        While     anaJysis       of       the 
rescored     data     with     items     as   a   fixed   effect   refutes  this 
position,   the  differences between  the  0%   and  the  average  of 
the  40%   and  80%   exposure  groups   is  not    strong] y  significant, 
and   is   not    significant   when  items  are   used  as  an  error  term 
under     the     items     as     a     random     effect      mode].     This   fact 
implies     that     the     presence     of    malformed     or       erroneous 
instances     is     detrimental      to     implicit   learning  under  the 
observational/memorization  learning  paradigm.     In     general, 
it      appears     that      only  the   100%   grammatical   exposure  group 
was  able  to make  use  of the  rules  in  any     significant      way. 
It      is     unfortunately     not      possible     in     this   experimental 
design  to  determine     whether     the     lessened     discriminatory 
ability     of  the mixed  and  nongrammatical   exposure  groups   is 
due  to  an  insufficient   number of  representative  grammatical 
items     or     to     the     presence     of     noninstances     which might 
interfere  with  correct   ruJ e   abstraction,   since     the     number 
of     grammatical      acquisition     items     is   confounded with  the 
number  of  nongrammatical   acquisition  items. 
It is also unclear to what extent the 100% exposure 
group's increased ability to discriminate grammatical and 
nongrammat i ca] items is due to a larger potential set of 
exemplars     for     analogies     rather than to  a better  abstract 
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representalion     of       the       ruJes. Examination       of       the 
significant exposure by item interaction shows thai the 
100% group does better on grammalical items which are 
moderate] y ana] ogous to at J east half of the grammalica] 
acquisition items (e.g. posses similar trigrams such as VPS 
and VPX). The greater the number of representative 
grammatical acquisition items seen, the greater the number 
of avai]ab]e exemplars and the greater the sa]ience of the 
ruJes (Reber, et a]., 1980). Hence the significant 
exposure by item interaction supports both the ana] ogy 
theory and the impJicit abstraction theory of imp]icit 
]earni ng. 
Similarities  in  ProbJ em SoJving  Literature 
While it is not possible to i so] ate the J earni ng 
process invoJved in the observationa]/memorization learning 
paradigm, studies from the problem solving literature do 
provide some insight into the analog and implicit 
abstraction processes and may be useful when designing an 
implicit learning experiment to distinguish between the 
analog and implicit abstraction theories. In an experiment 
by Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981) physics experts 
(professors) and novices (completed one physics course) 
f i rsl sorted physics problems i n1 o cai egori es and then 
verbalized while solving them. It was found that novices 
tend     to     categorize     the  problems  based  on  surface  details 
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such as "fulcrum used", "spring iensjon", or "work 
related". Experts categorized the problems according to 
the three main Jaws of physics. The experts, having greater 
experience with this type of problem, were able to 
categorize the problems on the basis of rules, whereas the 
novices, lacking the necessary amount of experience, 
concentrated on individual items. The difference between 
novices and experts categorizations was thus due not to 
knowledge of the rules (the novices did know the three main 
laws of physics) but to quick identification of the useful 
rules. It appears that experts may be using an implicit 
strategy when comparing problems to their rule knowledge 
base, while novices may be using an analog strategy of 
compari ng  problem det aj1s wi t h remembered problems. 
This analog/rule difference in approach between 
experts and novices was also found in a study by Larkin, 
McDermott, Simon and Simon (1980). They discovered that 
when solving physics problems, novices often work backwards 
in a bottom-up style, whereas experts appear to use a more 
top-down approach by working forward from the givens to the 
answers. Novices seem to be using a "search and identify" 
strategy which may or may not lead to a correct solution. 
If the similarity between the problem and remembered 
exemplar problems is not strong enough, the novices will be 
less likely to discover the correct method of solution 
through     analogy.       The     "flash    of insight"   which leads to 
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so] ut i on  of an obscure     problem    may    be     due     to     implicit 
abstraction!        Experts  began with  a more  who! i st i c  grasp of 
the     problem,     possibly     due     not      on] y     to     their     greater 
know]edge base but   to  their  implicit   approach. 
Anderson, Greeno, Kline and Neves (1981) theorized 
that problem sojving starts by using analogy to stored 
exemplars to Jocate examples of similar problems. As a 
result of increased experience with analogous problems, 
generalization occurs and global rules for solution are 
developed (Fried & Holyoak, 1983). These abstract rule 
structures may also be developed by induction, provided 
heuristics are used to adequately constrain the process 
(Anderson, et al ., 1981; Pinker, 1979). Over time, a 
schema for correct action under certain circumstances is 
developed. While it is not known how much of this process 
is implicit, indications are that an interaction between 
explicit and implicit learning can be beneficial. Subjects 
who are first taught a FSG and then experience implicit 
learning of grammatical items outperform subjects who 
experience unembel1ished implicit learning or simple FSG 
learning without item experience (Reber, et al., 1980). 
One hypothesis is that early FSG training acts to 
establish cognitive boundaries for implicit rule induction, 
allowing subjects to make better use of their item 
observation time. 
The  idea of a  schema    of     rules     for     problem     solving 
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seems to imply thai once ruJes are learned, individual 
problem exerap]ars no longer serve a purpose and are 
forgotten. However, it is not beneficial for individuals 
to ]earn only exceptionless rules (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). 
Since category membership is not always all or none (e.g. 
"man is ape and not ape"), specific instances are helpful 
in identifying the range of acceptable deviations from the 
prototype or rules {Jones, 1982). In some instances, such 
as in chess, the entire rule system must yield to the 
exceptional instance. Brooks (1978) calls this cognitive 
odds playing. Knowledge of the particular can overrule the 
general, and the general can be used to critically examine 
the particular   for  category membership. 
Evidence   for the     interaction     of    exemplar     and     rule 
knowledge     comes     from     a     si udy    on     computer     programming 
experts   and  novices   (McKeithen,   Reitman,   Ruet er     &     Hirtle, 
1981).     Subjects  were  asked  to  learn  a  1ist   of one  syllable 
words  taken   from a  computer programming  language by sorting 
the     words  into  related  groups.   When  the   subjects   felt   that 
they knew the  list,   they were  asked  to    recall      it     without 
reference     to     the     sorted words.     Novices   (one programming 
course)     and     expert     programmers     (graduate     students       or 
professors)     had     the     same  amount   of organization  in their 
recall   clustering,   but    experts  were   consistently better     at 
cued     recall     of the words  than the  novices.     Since  novices 
clustered the words  in mini-sentences,   and   experts  in terms 
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of programming concepts, one hypothesis for their 
differentia] performance is based on the analogy theory. A 
given word may be analogous to many other stored sentence 
exemplars, but to only a few programming concept exemplars. 
Thus experts would be less likely to cue into erroneous 
items and should make fewer errors during recall. The 
experts' more detailed knowledge of programming languages 
and syntax rules allowed them to efficiently cluster the 
exemplars . 
Thus, having both types of information available can 
greatly speed reaction to stimuli and increase recall 
accuracy. Storage of exemplars allows for quick 
identification of appropriate categories or rule systems 
via analogy (Anzai & Simon, 1977; Green, 1979). The 
selected rule system is then used to quickly guide or 
generate a response (Larkin, et al., 1980; Winston, 1978). 
It is interesting to note that most of the preceding 
theories on problem solving and category learning presume 
that exemplar learning (analogy theory) precedes rule 
learning (implicit abstraction theory). Rule information 
is developed through repeated exposure to exemplars 
(Gibson, 1979; Grandy, 1972). Because the contingencies of 
experience are variable and continuously changing for each 
individual, many of the rules known will be difficult to 
pinpoint and to verbalize (Baldwin & Baldwin, 1978). In 
this   sense,  much  of our knowledge  is  implicit,  and 
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verbalizab]e  know]edge  is   a  special   case   (MacKay,   1974). 
Given thai nonverbal izab]e 1earning is indeed a major 
component of human learning, it must be asked whether 
Reber's implicit abstraction theory t ruJ y models natural 
nonverbali zab]e learning. Much of the problem solving 
literature contains examples of both implicit abstraction 
and exemplar learning in fairly naturalistic and 
ecologically va]id situations. None of the problem solving 
experiments show evidence of only one type of learning. For 
example, expert physics subjects still used exemplar 
knowledge to guide and fine tune their implicit rule search 
(Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Thus, if Reber's 
paradigm is valid, it is unique in modeling human learning 
wherein only one type of learning (implicit abstraction) 
occurs. Further studies need to be done to determine if 
subjects learning under Reber's paradigm do indeed bypass 
exemplar learning completely, as Reber claims. The 
possibility that they learn exemplars and then move on to 
rule  abstraction can  not   as  yet   be  discounted. 
Summary 
The major findings of these two experiments  are  that 
chance  is  not  a  proper  baseline  for implicit learning 
studies,  and  that   the   amount   of   grammatical   and 
nongrammatical    exposure   determines  the   level   of 
discriminatory ability and differentially affects responses 
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•to individual items. Wh i 1 e implicit learning does occur, 
other factors such as prior know]edge may influence 
performance on the discrimination tasks designed to test 
the extent of subjects' implicit]y acquired rule knowledge. 
Control groups are essential in isolating the degree of 
discriminatory performance due to factors other than 
implicit   learning  during  the  acquisition phase. 
The results support Reber's contentions that implicit 
learning is a recognizable learning process. His learning 
paradigm has been shown to produce significant results 
using control group baselines. However, the results from 
Experiments 1 and 2 also call into question evidence on the 
strength and longevity of implicit learning. Subjects 
shown noninstances of the grammar (nongrammatical items) as 
well as grammatical items during acquisition do not seem to 
be able to use the grammatical rule information when making 
discriminations. It is not clear whether this is due to an 
inability to discount the nongrammatical items when 
abstracting the rules, or to an insufficient number of rule 
created items for study. An explanation based on the 
analogy theory is also potentially valid. Subjects could 
be distinguishing between the two types of stored exemplars 
on the basis of heuristics (e.g. irregularity/regularity) 
which inadequately reflect the grammar rules. This would 
lead to errors in judgement when making analogies to new 
items,   since  the  exemplar  category  assignments would  not   be 
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totaj]y accurate. Further work thus needs to be done to 
determine whether the acquisition learning process is a]] 
analog storage of exemplars, all implicit abstraction of 
the rules, or whether it begins with analogies and proceeds 
to rule induction, as suggested by problem solving 
lit erat ure. 
All   future  work   should make   use  of  appropria\ e  control 
groups. It        is       recommended     that      a     random     exposure 
(nongrammatical or 0%) control group be used in future 
implicit learning studies. While both control groups in 
Experiment 1 (random exposure or no exposure) exhibited 
similar response behavior and were not statistically 
different , the former controls for both lack of exposure to 
the rules and participation in a memorization task with 
nonmeani ngful   stimulus   items. 
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Appendj x A 
Experiment    1   - AnaJysJs 
Mode !] I 
Random/Fjxed 
Source Effe set Leve] ( nest d ng) 
a  exposure c<\ 3  = 1, 2 ,3 F 
b  cai egory /3K k = 1/ 2 F 
c   si rj ngs V*(fc> j   = 1. • .28 F (cat egory) 
s   subjects £;c.ri j     = I. • .17 R (exposure) 
Expected Mean Squares df F 
a +  s 2 MSa/MSs 
b + bs 1 MSb/MSb: s 
c +  cs 54 MSc/MScs 
s 48 
ab +  bs 2 MSab/MSbs 
ac  +  cs 108 MSac/MS. :s 
bs 48 
cs 2, 592 
2,855   = N-l 
ANOVA Summary Tab]e 
SS df MS F 
a 19.6912 2 9.8456 see  comparisons 
b 1.3029 1 1.3029 F(l,48)   =   3.6857 
c 44.2066 54 .8186 F(54,2592)   =  4.0706   ** 
s 22.3592 48 .4658 
ab 2.425 2 1.2125 see  comparisons 
ac 30.7794 108 .2850 F(108,2592)   =   1.4172   * 
bs 16.9686 48 .3535 
cs 521.2604 2592 .2011 
*• 
.05 
.01 
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AppendJx  B 
Experiment   1   - Analysis   2 
Mode]   II 
Random/Fi xed 
Source Effect LeveJ ( nest i ng) 
a exposure      oL-t j = 1,2,3       F 
b category     $« k = 1,2        F 
c strings       o.ioa 3 = 1...28     R (category) 
s subjects     -^!{j) i = 1...17     R (exposure) 
Expect ed Mean Squares   df F  
a + s + ac + cs 2    MSa + MScs/MSs + MSac 
b + c + bs + cs 1    MSb + MScs/MSc + MSbs 
c + cs 54    MSc/MScs 
s + cs 48    MSs/MScs 
ab + ac + bs + cs 2   MSab + MScs/MSac + MSbs 
ac + cs 108    MSac/MScs 
bs + cs 48    MSbs/MScs 
cs 2,592     
2,855 = N-l 
ANQVA Summary Tab]e 
SS df      MS F 
2 9.8456 see comparisons 
1 1.3029 F(l,92) = 1.2832 
54 .8186 F(54,2592) = 4.0706 ** 
48 .4658 F(48,2592) = 2.3163 ** 
2 1.2125 see comparisons 
108 .2850 F(108,2592) = 1.4172 * 
48 .3535 F(48,2592) = 1.7578 ** 
a 19, ,6912 
b 1, .3029 
c 44. .2066 
s 22, .3592 
ab 2, .425 
ac 30, .7794 
bs 16, .9686 
cs 521.2604    2592      .2011 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Appendj x   C 
Experiment    2  - Anay] si s   1 
M< Dde ] I 
Random/Fj xed 
Source Effect LeveJ (nest j ng) 
a   exposure <*; 3   = 1, 2 ,3,4 F 
b  cal egory £* k = 1, 2 F 
c   si ri ngs VJUK} ]   = I. * .28 F   (category) 
s   subject s sup i   = 1. • .12 R   (exposure) 
Expect ed Mean c                   1 Squares df F 
a +  s 3 MSa/MSs 
b +  bs 1 MSb/MSbs 
c  +  cs 54 MSc/MScs 
s 44 
ab  +  bs 3 MSab/MSbs 
ac  +  cs 162 MSac/MScs 
bs 44 
cs 2, 376 
2,687 = N-l 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
ANOVA Summary Table 
SS df MS 
a 10.7664 3 
b 3.4286 1 
c 29.6949 54 
s 28.1607 44 
ab .6964 3 
ac 44.0789 162 
bs 24.3750 44 
cs 488.2976 2376 
.5888 
.4286 
.5499 
.6400 
.2321 
.2721 
.5540 
.2055 
see compare sons 
F(l,44) = 5.3572 * 
F(54,2376) = 2.6759 
see compard sons 
F(162,2376) = 1.3241 
** 
** 
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Appendj x D 
Experiment 2 - Analysis 
Source 
a exposure 
b category 
c st ri ngs 
s subject s 
Mode]   II 
Effect Level 
*; j  =  1,2,3,4 
PK k =  1,2 
]   =   1...28 
i   =  1. . .12 
Random/Fi xed 
(nest ing) 
F 
F 
R (cat egory) 
R (exposure) 
Expect ed Mean Squares   df 
a + s + 
b + c + 
c + cs 
s + cs 
ab + ac 
ac + 
bs + 
cs 
ac + cs 
bs + cs 
+ bs + cs 
cs 
cs 
3 
1 
54 
44 
3 
162 
44 
2,376 
"2,687 = N-l 
MSa + MScs/MSs + MSac 
MSb + MScs/MSc + MSbs 
MSc/MScs 
MSS/MSCS 
MSab + MScs/MSac + MSbs 
MSac/MScs 
MSbs/MScs 
SS df 
ANOVA Summary Tab]e 
MS 
a 
b 
c 
s 
ab 
ac 
bs 
10.7664 
3.4286 
29.6949 
28.1607 
.6964 
44.0789 
24.3750 
cs 488.2976 
3 3.5888 see comparj sons 
1 3.4286 F(l,97) = 3.2921 
54 .5499 F(54,2376) = 2.6759 ** 
44 .6400 F{44,2376) = 3.1144 ** 
3 .2321 see comparisons 
162 .2721 F(162,2376) = 1.3241 ** 
44 .5540 F(44,2376) = 2.6959 ** 
2376 .2055 
** 
P < 
P < 
.05 
.01 
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Experiment 
Appendj x E 
2 - Rescored Dai a ANOVAs 
ANOVA Summary Tab]e 
(Mode] I - II ems as fixed effect) 
SS df MS F 
a 10.4941 3 3 .4980 see compare sons 
b 2.5015 1 2 .5015 F(l,44) = 4.3152 * 
c 23.6950 54 .4388 F(54,2376) = 2.1076 ** 
s 18.3393 44 .4168 
ab .4925 3 .1642 see compari sons 
ac 43.7217 162 .2699 F(162,2376) = 1.2963 * 
bs 25.5060 44 .5797 
cs 494.6547 2376 .2082 
ANOVA Summary Tab]e 
(ModeJ II - Items as random effect) 
SS df MS 
a 10.4941 3 3 .4980 
b 2.5015 1 2 .5015 
c 23.6950 54 .4388 
s 18.3393 44 .4168 
ab .4925 3 .1642 
ac 43.7217 162 .2699 
bs 25.5060 44 .5797 
cs 494.6547 2376 .2082 
see  compare sons 
F(l,93)   =   2.6605 
F(54,2376)   =  2.1076   ** 
F(44,2376)   =   2.0019   ** 
see  compari sons 
F(162,2376)   =   1.2963   * 
F(44,2376)   =  2.7843 
Key to Letter Meanings 
a =  exposure 
b =  cat egory 
c  =   si ri ngs 
s  =  subject s 
*  p   <    .05 
**   P   <    .01 
72 
Appendj x F 
Percent Correcl 
For the Exposure by Djscrjndnation Strjng 
In Experimenl 1 
In1 eract Jon 
St ri ngs 
Grammat j ca] 
PVPS 
PTVV 
PTTVV 
TSSXS 
TXXVV 
PTTVPS 
TSXXW 
TXXTW 
TXXVPS 
PTTTTVV 
PTVPXVV 
PVPXTW 
TSSSSXS 
TSXXTVV 
TXXTTW 
TXXTVPS 
PTTTTTVV 
PTTTTVPS 
PTTVPXVV 
PTVPXVPS 
PVPXTTVV 
TSSSXXVV 
TSSXXTW 
TSSXXVPS 
TSXXTTVV 
TSXXTVPS 
TXXTTTW 
TXXTTVPS 
Exposure 
GrammatjcaJ    Nongrammatjca]    Zero 
71 47 59 
76 65 41 
94 76 88 
38 47 65 
82 76 71 
88 47 47 
88 47 94 
82 82 88 
88 47 53 
94 59 65 
76 18 24 
82 65 35 
94 47 41 
88 65 65 
76 82 88 
76 41 41 
76 59 65 
82 47 53 
76 35 35 
76 29 47 
82 53 59 
82 82 76 
82 32 94 
82 59 53 
76 76 82 
82 24 41 
76 65 82 
71 53 47 
{continued on next page) 
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Exposure 
Strings        Grammatical    NongrammaijcaJ    Zero 
Nongrammat icaj 
PPS 47 65 29 
PSP 71 35 53 
XSP 76 53 71 
TSX 59 65 71 
TVST 76 59 65 
XPVS 76 76 82 
XVTS 71 59 65 
XXVX 71 76 59 
VSSXX 71 41 47 
SPPVP 88 71 88 
SSSVT 71 59 82 
VPVTT 53 59 71 
TSTXT 65 29 29 
VSPSV 59 29 35 
PVSXVV 59 76 53 
PVVTSP 53 76 71 
TXXVSS 41 41 18 
VPVPSV 65 35 47 
XSXXPTS 65 71 59 
PSPSXSP 88 53 47 
SXXPSTV 94 76 88 
XSPPTPS 100 59 76 
STTPSVP 82 82 76 
TVXVVVS 47 59 65 
SPTVPTP 76 47 47 
PTSPXXVX 82 59 59 
VVPTPSST 82 41 2 9 
VXXPPVXS 65 71 53 
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Exposure 
Strings        GrammaiicaJ    Nongramraal j ca] Zero 
Nongrammat i caJ 
PPS 47 65 29 
PSP 71 35 53 
XSP 76 53 71 
TSX 59 65 71 
TVST 76 59 65 
XPVS 76 76 82 
XVTS 71 59 65 
XXVX 71 76 59 
VSSXX 71 41 47 
SPPVP 88 71 88 
SSSVT 71 59 82 
VPVTT 53 59 71 
TSTXT 65 29 2 9 
VSPSV 59 29 35 
PVSXVV 59 76 53 
PVVTSP 53 76 71 
TXXVSS 41 41 18 
VPVPSV 65 35 47 
XSXXPTS 65 71 59 
PSPSXSP 88 53 47 
SXXPSTV 94 76 88 
XSPPTPS 100 59 76 
STTPSVP 82 82 76 
TVXVVVS 47 59 65 
SPTVPTP 76 47 47 
PTSPXXVX 82 59 59 
VVPTPSST 82 41 29 
VXXPPVXS 65 71 53 
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Appenddx   G 
Percent   Correct 
For  1he  Exposure by Dd scrdmd nat d on  String  Interact ion 
In  Experiment    2 
Exposure 
St rd ngs 100% 80% 40% 0% 
Grammat d caJ 
PVPS 100 75 58 42 
PTW 83 50 67 83 
PTTW 75 75 83 67 
TSSXS 92 75 58 42 
TXXVV 100 58 75 58 
PTTVPS 92 67 58 42 
TSXXVV 100 83 75 58 
TXXTVV 50 50 75 67 
TXXVPS 92 75 67 75 
PTTTTW 33 83 58 42 
PTVPXVV 75 75 42 42 
PVPXTVV 100 67 33 42 
TSSSSXS 92 75 75 42 
TSXXTW 67 92 75 75 
TXXTTVV 50 67 92 67 
TXXTVPS 58 67 50 58 
PTTTTTW 67 58 75 42 
PTTTTVPS 83 75 75 50 
PTTVPXVV 67 42 33 75 
PTVPXVPS 92 58 42 33 
PVPXTTVV 75 67 92 75 
TSSSXXVV 75 92 92 58 
TSSXXTVV 92 58 75 50 
TSSXXVPS 100 83 83 83 
TSXXTTVV 75 50 75 50 
TSXXTVPS 83 67 58 75 
TXXTTTVV 42 42 50 58 
TXXTTVPS 50 83 50 50 
(cont d nued on next p age) 
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Exposure 
Strings 100%      80%      40%       0% 
Nongrammal d ca] 
TVST 
XXVX 
VSSXX 
SSSVT 
VSPSV 
PVSXVV 
PVVTSP 
TXXVSS 
VPVPSV 
XSXXPTS 
PSPSXSP 
SXXPSTV 
XSPPTPS 
STTPSVP 
TVXVVVS 
SPTVPTP 
PTSPXXVX 
PXSTXVVS 
TXTSPSXV 
TSXTPPTV 
TWSVVVX 
VSSSVXST 
TPVSVPXP 
VVXTTPPT 
TVPPPSSS 
VPXTTPVtf 
VVPTPSST 
VXXPPVXS 
75 58 92 67 
83 67 42 67 
58 50 42 25 
75 67 50 100 
58 50 75 50 
33 58 75 75 
58 42 67 58 
50 67 17 42 
58 25 58 42 
67 58 33 50 
92 75 58 50 
92 92 50 50 
75 83 67 67 
67 50 58 33 
50 58 67 50 
92 67 50 67 
83 75 83 50 
67 58 75 50 
83 75 75 75 
67 75 50 67 
83 75 50 67 
67 42 67 58 
67 75 42 75 
75 50 42 50 
42 25 50 58 
67 58 67 33 
92 58 58 42 
92 50 58 42 
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Fool not e 
The expected mean squares are presented in simplified 
form: (1) sma]J letters represent components of variance 
usua]]y denoted as 3 with these Jetters as subscripts, and 
(2) the numerical coefficients that multiply the components 
of  variance     are     omitted.        For     example,      ab     stands     for 
JK?Sab- 
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